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Decentralisation and central-local relations: The case of policing and mental health in 
England 
Over the last decade, British governments have advocated a combined policing and health 
policy based on the premise that everyday more people come to police attention due to mental 
illness issues. Central authorities emphasise co-produced local community initiatives including 
street triage and clinical liaison and diversion programmes as mechanism for better managing 
mental health issues.   The model of governance of policing and mental health developed by 
the Conservative governments emphasises in a decentralisation of services as a means of better 
managing local demands.  Consequently, much of the policy burden falls upon local police 
forces and the austerity-afflicted NHS overstressing the front lines of delivery. We argue that 
this rationale challenges the traditionally established model of central-local governance which 
saw local authorities implementing national policy. However, whilst central government has 
shifted responsibility for services to local deliverers, the structural and policy barriers to an 
integrated approach to mental health and policing have proven difficult to change when directed 
from the centre of government. The executive’s continuous direction of policy in a climate of 
austerity politics triggers not only a debate on the sustainability of local governance, but also 
with regard to what power of delivery local institutions have. We conclude that the nature of 
governmental decentralisation on cross-sectorial policymaking can jeopardised the creation of 
sustainable local governance practices. 
Keywords: austerity, decentralisation, central-local governance, police, NHS. 
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Central-local relations in the UK have been an issue of contention for most of the post-war 
period. After a long period of centralisation –particularly during the Thatcher government– 
there has been a recognition by all main parties of the need to reinvigorate local government.  
Recently both the devolution agenda and austerity economics have seen a significant attempt 
to shift responsibilities for key policies to local government. The Conservative-Liberal 
Coalition (2010–2015) and the succeeding governments of David Cameron and Theresa May 
pushed for a model of central-local governance that relies heavily in improving quality of 
services while keeping costs down (Lowndes and Gardner, 2016). Hence a policy of austerity 
has been accompanied by an increasing focus on local delivery (see Diamond, 2015). 
Consequently, local services have set up initiatives to manage a growing demand in their 
capabilities, although, with a smaller workforce and less resources at hand. 
In this article, we question the current model of austerity-driven decentralisation reform 
and suggest that this has brought unexpected outcomes for local institutional accommodation.  
We use the policing and mental health sectors as case studies to explore how recent 
decentralisation policies have created complex relations of co-production and inter-agency at 
the local level, shedding light on what the effect has been for central-local relations. The 
problem is that in many ways the institutional arrangements at local level make it difficult for 
agencies on the ground to respond in ways that the centre expects.  The capacity for joined up 
delivery is weak at local level because most institutions, whether it is the police or health 
authorities, respond to national requirements. 
On the one hand, central government has tried to tackle complex issues like mental 
health through supporting local initiatives.  Policies have attempted to create local network such 
as the police forces and the NHS, to work with newly established ones including the Office of 
the Police and Crime Commissioner (PCC) and the Clinical Commissioning Groups (CCGs). 
Governments have funded policy programmes, such as, ‘No Health Without Mental Health’ 
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(HM Government, 2011), and the ‘Mental Health Crisis Care Concordat’ (HM Government, 
2014a). Since 2013, street triage pilots (a service where mental health nurses accompany 
officers to incidents where police believe people need immediate mental health support), have 
been implemented in almost all regions of England, following the Coalition’s plans to keep 
people out of custodial settings and reduce the demands on police time (HM Government, 
2013). However, we argue that these and other service reforms towards a limited state have 
resulted in a dramatic reduction of local capabilities, especially in the welfare policy areas, 
including the policing and health (Evans, 2010; Smith and Jones, 2015). Police forces and the 
NHS have been victim of reductions to its services and personnel (Reiner, 2016; Heslin et al., 
2016). Not less relevant, fiscal cuts to spending in these two sectors have not always been well-
received by the users and the overall public (Clarke, et al., 2013).  
We begin the paper by presenting a conceptual approach to central-local relations. We 
use this theoretical framework to provide a lens through which to understand the governance 
changes in policing and mental health policy as a result of decentralisation. We then provide 
empirical evidence on policing and mental health governance reforms. The article explores how 
the pulling together of these two sectors has fallen prey of unintended consequences due to an 
incongruent steering from the centre. In the analytical section, we argue first that certain 
structural and policy barriers to an integrated approach in local policing and mental health 
governance have proven difficult to change when directed from the executive. Second, we 
propose that continuous policy change in a post-crisis climate has triggered not only a debate 
on whether local governance is a sustainable response to such a demand for outputs, but also 
on what delivery powers local institutions have. Third, we reflect on the idea that while public 
institutions are protecting themselves from risk and further budgetary cuts, the lack of the 
necessary powers to address complex corporate differences has put local policy communities 
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at a crossroad. We conclude by examining the current trade-off between decentralisation, 
austerity, management capabilities, and central-local governance issues. 
 
Decentralisation and central-local relations 
Changes occurring in local government have highlighted the difficulty of adjusting service 
delivery to fluctuating sources of national funding. Recent scholarship has emphasised on the 
necessity of institutional resilience among local public services in order to endure austerity 
(Gardner, 2017; Rex, 2019). To some scholars, the new wave of decentralized decision-making 
has prompted large and small administrative units to restructure, yet, in many places, the 
reshuffling of people and resources strays little from existing arrangements (Richardson, 
Durose and Dean, 2018). Wilson and Game (2011), for example, identified three models that 
explain these processes of adaptation: power dependence, mostly following Rhodes (1988), 
principal-agent relations, brought forward, for instance, by Lane (2006), and network 
governance approaches frequently used by scholars studying macro, meso, and micro levels of 
policymaking (see, Klijn and Koppenjan, 2016; Bailey and Wood, 2017).   
At one level, the UK’s post-1945 situation can be described one of power dependence 
where, as Rhodes (1988) points out, whilst the centre was formally in control, its dependence 
on local government for delivery made the relationship complex. The Thatcher administration 
attempted to assert a principal-agent model with local authorities either by-passed or seen as 
agents delivering central government policy.  More recently with a reaction against centralised 
governance there has been a focus on partnership and devolution leading to the creation of 
complex networks for policy delivery.  However, whilst there seems to be a chronological 
development due to institutional layering (Thelen, 2009), the case is that in UK all three models 
have been used interchangeably.  We argue that the relationship between the centre and local 
agencies is often contingent and includes elements of dependence, hierarchy and networks.   
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The key issue has been that an agenda of decentralisation has been developed not as a 
mechanism of local accountability or democracy but as a means for reducing funding.  For 
example, in April 2015, one month before the general election in which Cameron won the re-
election, Theresa May, the then Home Secretary, announced further cuts to police budgets 
across the country despite police personnel forecasting a worsening of services if resources 
were to disappear (Morris, 2015). Local agencies have functioned as mechanism for 
depoliticising austerity through what Bulpitt (1983) calls the dual polity by shifting 
responsibility for declining services from national to local level.  The government cuts spending 
and placed the onus of reform on local agencies to maintain services with restricted budgets 
(Diamond, 2014; Griffiths, 2009). For example, the executive legitimised decreases in the 
police force by arguing crime continued to fall in the UK (Newburn, 2015).  
 At the same time the Coalition government, for example, pushed forward its public 
services programme on the notion ‘that it was time to disperse power and hand it back to the 
people and communities’ (Benyon, 2011). In the context of economic crisis, the focus of policy 
was on the need to reduce what was perceived as an expensive and inefficient centralised state.  
The Coalition Government’s model of strict cost-containment was based on the ethos: ‘do 
better, with less’. The rationale behind it implied that public services could provide the same 
level of service with less money and so invoking Thatcherite New Public Management (NPM) 
of strong ‘managerialism’ through a ‘hard-headed, business-minded, cost-conscious, and data-
driven approach to government makeover’ (Hood and Dixon, 2015, p. 15).  
Government focussed on the costs of policy whilst letting governing responsibilities fall 
to local authorities who became responsible for delivering core services with much less money. 
As O’Driscoll argued, ‘responsibilities for policymaking in the communities have encouraged 
regional stakeholders to form groups to develop local policies, in response to national policies’ 
(2007, p. 124). While at the core of the Big Society rested on the reduction of the state –at 
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whatever unorthodox means- the overall strategy for cutting public spending meant more social 
enterprise and more private sector dependence for societal service delivery (Smith, 2010; see 
also Kerr and Hayton, 2015; Dommett, 2015).  
The Conservative governments post austerity local policy framework reflects a network 
governance model (see Bevir and Rhodes, 2016) but with more focus on central control than 
would be normally assumed within this approach. For example, the Coalition created a network 
encompassing police, local authorities, and public health services around the Mental Health 
Crisis Care Concordat, a joint statement to co-produce mental health and safety policies 
between services. The concordat came to recognise the ‘concerns about the way in which health 
services, social care services and police forces work together in response to mental health 
crises’ (HM Government, 2014b).  
Reveruzzi and Pilling (2016), argued, nonetheless, that decentralised network governance 
produced a sense ‘frustration for delegated governance’ (see on such issue Dommett and 
Flinders, 2015) among local service when evaluating the mental health concordat. They 
described such discontent in these terms: 
 
Although the provision of mental health crisis interventions initiated through contact with 
the police or other members of the emergency services is not a preferred route into care, it 
is widely recognised that police officers remain a gateway to care for some people in crisis. 
(…) police officers have often experienced difficulty in gaining an adequate response from 
local health and/or social care agencies. These problems can be exacerbated by the 
reluctance of some agencies to share information about the person in crisis and an 
unwillingness on the part of some services to accept referrals from police officers (p. 11).  
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For the local institutions, a flawed network governance has occurred as a result of various 
structural, budget, and power relations. Because of a limited capacity for tax collection, for 
instance, local governance autonomy from government is limited (see Stoker, 2011; Hood and 
Dixon, 2015). Since the Coalition era, the central authorities have encouraged public 
institutions to reform their administrations (mostly getting rid of costly services), and not less, 
seek support from private actors (Page, 2011).  Services have been decentralised but without 
providing either the resources or the governance structures to ensure effective delivery. As 
Lowndes and McCaughie (2013) put it, the conservative’s decentralisation and inter-
institutional network governance agendas has yet not come up to expectations, less so in the 
context of post-financial crisis austerity. Andrews and Entwistle (2015) noted that inter-
institutional partnering do not necessarily improve the quality services, less so if they are left 
to their devices. For policy communities and networks to be successful, they need steering and 
also costing management capacity, however, in this case, this role is performed by overstressed 
local public administrators. 
The problem in the UK is that the relationship between the centre and local has always 
been contested.  Different models of relationships have been used but often they have been 
implicit rather than explicit.  There has always been an asymmetry of power (Marsh, Richards 
and Smith, 2003) with the centre dominating, but, the nature of the asymmetry has varied.  
Consequently, power dependence, principal-agent and network models have built on, rather 
than replaced, each other.   
In sum, we argue that recent decentralisation reforms in the advanced democracies have 
triggered unexpected outcomes for local governance. The interplay between the reduction of 
central top-down accountabilities and the lack of steering has been critically stressed by the 
recent era of economic austerity (Ansell and Torfing, 2014; Davies and Thompson, 2016).  A 
new responsibility for service delivery within the context of restrained resources has been 
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placed on local government and agencies which has created particular strains in the delivery of 
local services.  In the next section, we use the policing and mental health sectors to explore 
recent complex co-production and inter-agency at the local level, and their effect upon central-
local relations. 
  
Reforming the police: funding, accountability, and mission 
The period since 2010 has seen considerable reforms in governance in areas ranging from 
criminality and the rule of law, to the pensions system and the environment (Richards, Smith, 
and Hay, 2014; Berry, 2016; Carter and Clements 2015).  Within this context there has been a 
considerable change in the role of the police with an increased focus on ‘partnership, co-
funding, and co-production, but that rejects the binary proposition that the state spends too 
much’ (Griffiths and Kippin, 2013, p. 12). Under New Labour, government prioritised tackling 
anti-social behaviour, and augmented police spending to resource reforms including an increase 
to statutory local policy networks for partnership working, and a national model of community 
support through civilian neighbourhood policing (Squires, 2008). However, the Coalition and 
the succeeding Tories governments emphasised in a model that placed localism within a 
national regulatory framework with the reform of national organisations, introducing a new 
non-ministerial department, the National Crime Agency, along other initiatives such as the 
College of Policing, and the PCCs.  
Cameron and later May’s agent-based agenda for decentralisation, for instance, created 
scorn among police personnel who saw budget cuts as reducing operational capabilities and an 
intrusion to their professional autonomy (see Bayley and Stenning, 2016). The period following 
2010 saw a 20% real term cut in central government funding. A decreasing trend in the numbers 
of police officers in England and Wales lowered the workforce from 171,600 in 2010, to 
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123,171 in March 2019. Police community support officers (PCSO) added to 9,547, a negative 
5.8 percentage change in relation to 2018 (Home Office, 2019). 
To some observers, the Government’s reforms pointed towards a power-dependence 
governance model with the regions that resulted in ‘a much less comfortable relationship 
between the government and the police service’ (Newburn, 2015). Sarah Thornton, who was 
appointed to lead the National Police Chiefs’ Council (NPCC) in July 2015, argued that the 
police system needed to go under a ‘re-imagination’ process as an expected loss of 35,000 
police posts by 2020 is a ‘game-changer’ (Shaw, 2015). A few days before Thornton’s 
comments, Theresa May had told the Police Federation to stop ‘crying wolf’ about the impact 
of financial cuts, accusing the leaders of the body of ‘scaremongering’ over the effect of cuts 
while crime was falling (BBC, 2015).  
Across England, cuts have produced a closure of police stations and a reduction of 
opening hours at others. Since police is retreating from interaction with local users, the 
remaining points of contact are saturated by the same, or even increasing demand of 
emergencies. Cuts to police funding from central government became so critical by 2015 that 
even Cameron’s constituency in Oxfordshire was meant to cut £60 million in police force 
savings triggering allegations from local representatives (Hopkins, 2015). 
Mental health crises, on the other hand, mean a continuous rise of people depending on 
contacting the police first before being referred to the adequate expert health services. Recent 
data compiled from 35 forces in England, Wales and Northern Ireland showed that police are 
spending as much as 40% of their time dealing with incidents triggered by some kind of mental 
health issue. Also, the overall number of incidents with a mental health aspect rose by 33% 
between 2011 and 2014 (Quinn et al., 2016). In this vein, a report by the Home Affairs 
Committee in the House of Commons reported that one in four people will suffer from mental 
health illness at some point, and their illness brings with it a vulnerability that makes it likely 
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they will come into contact with the police (House of Commons, 2015, p. 7). The report goes 
on to argue: 
 
For many people experiencing an acute health crisis, a police officer is not the professional 
best placed to help them, nor is dealing with acute health crises the best use of police 
officers’ time and skills. We believe that the police should not be filling gaps in mental 
health services (House of Commons, 2015, p. 8). 
 
The Coalition’s programme (2010) promised to end top-down government and promote 
decentralisation by encouraging a power-based model to local governance under the adage 
‘devolving power from the centre’ (see Travers, 2015). Cameron, and May later instituted an 
agenda of mixed resource allocation, pushing forward the idea that police needed to become 
more specialised with fewer staff. Through a central-local relation based on policy networks 
and partnership boards, police personnel became able to take a leading role in the co-delivery 
of mental health services so to improve the experience of individuals in crisis. This happened 
mostly as police forces across the country joined multi-agency experiences that develop 
strategic oversight, assigned operational responsibilities and processes, and established clear 
crime prevention and care pathways. Police personnel was exposed to deal with new challenges 
regarding the rule of law through a discretionary risk-based rationale. On the other hand, mental 
health issues demanded flexible horizontal interaction with partner agencies, most notably the 
health services from the NHS, posing a challenge to what hierarchic British policing has been 
over the last decades.  
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Reshaping mental health policy  
One of the cardinal questions regarding health policy by 2010 was what future there was for a 
multi-expert and patient-centred NHS. The health policy sector and particularly mental health 
practice was so vast and complex in England, that effective governance was deemed a 
complicated business (Tempest, 2006). During New Labour, mental health policy was 
characterised by questions of how to set up structures and processes, institute professional 
jurisdictions, and how create sustainable links with the wider health and welfare policy sectors 
(Pilgrim and Ramon, 2009). Practical decision-making, multi-disciplinary working and team 
management engrained as three concepts that health practitioners became constantly challenged 
with (Ovretveit, Mathias and Thompson, 1997). Were these complexities taking into 
consideration by more recent governments when reshaping mental health governance policy? 
Most probably yes. However, did this reflect in the executive’s decentralisation policy since 
2010? Here the answer is less clear. For instance, Andrew Lansley, who was Shadow Secretary 
of State for Health and later sat in government with Cameron, set the tone back in 2006 for 
what was to come: ‘standardisation across the NHS would derive not so much from political or 
managerial requirements as from clinical needs for reliability and quality’ (Lansley, 2006, p. 
23). Unluckily, mental health practices have resulted far from equal since 2010 as NHS Trusts 
and Clinical Commissioning Groups (CCGs) across England share scarce managerial 
guidelines outside their corporate remits (Mattheys, 2015). 
Through a power-dependence type of central–local relation, government introduced in 
February 2011 the ‘No Health Without Mental Health’ strategy co-signed between Secretary 
Lansley and Paul Burstow, Secretary for Care Services. In it, government stressed its view on 
how ‘action at local and national levels to implement this strategy will only be effective if there 
is sustained partnership working across all sectors’ (HM Government, 2011, p. 68). The 
document also argued the following:  
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the costs of mental health problems to the economy in England have recently been 
estimated at a massive £105 billion, and treatment costs are expected to double in the 
next 20 years. We simply cannot continue to allow costs to spiral upwards without 
ensuring that every pound of public money is being used efficiently (HM Government, 
2011, p. 2).  
 
Elusive public spending and more power into people’s hand at the local level were the two key 
drivers of the strategy, certainly a formula that echoed with the overall reform to the NHS. 
In the Coalition government, conservatives and liberal democrats took the flag of mental 
health supporting various initiatives. Deputy Prime Minister, Nick Clegg, called for people to 
nominate unsung mental health heroes ‘to celebrate those from every region – from healthcare 
professionals to next door neighbours – who have gone above and beyond to help, support or 
inspire people with mental health conditions’ (Office of the Deputy Prime Minister, 2015). 
Driven by hard data, government used a set of statistics to push mental health on to the top of 
government’s to-do list.  
Deputy Prime Minister, Nick Clegg launched in late 2014 the UK’s first Mental Health 
Taskforce promising important monetary resources to initiatives such as treatment and therapies 
for children and young adults. In Parliament, conservative MP Gavin Barnwell’s advocated to 
reform the Mental Health (Discrimination) Bill intended to reduce stigma and negative 
perceptions associated with mental illness. A public opinion survey showed by then that 67% 
of British adults believed people with mental health problems were discriminated against. The 
mentally ill were more widely seen as discriminated against than gypsies and travellers, 
transsexuals, immigrants, Muslims or disabled people (YouGov, 2013). 
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Civil society became part of the discussion as well by reviewing mental health policy 
and producing critical insights. The Royal College of Psychiatrist (RCPsych) published a 
document entitled ‘No Health Without Mental Health: the Supporting Evidence’, in which it 
outlined five key areas to strengthen policy, including: introducing screening services in acute 
hospitals and annual checks to patients; funding liaison mental health services in all hospitals; 
engaging patients and carers through information and education; re-organising commissioning 
and quality standards supervision; and, enhancing training in mental health in all health 
practitioners (RCPsych, 2010). Government’s and the RCPsych’s reports demanded for new 
resources to be created, however, making little resemblance to the austerity policy previously 
determined by the executive under the post-crisis fiscal plans. The reduction of public spending 
was forecasted by the policy community. Although health, pensions, and education were 
considered ‘protected’ expenditure (all three amounted for up to 44% by 2015 in government 
spending on services), the health sector has since faced the most austere cutbacks in the post-
war period (Parliament, 2015) 
Yet, the NHS was said to have reacted efficiently to the cuts by increasing its quantity 
of care provided. Government’s ‘do more, with less’ agent-type of maxim proved, to some 
observers, partly successful as ‘waiting times for inpatient and outpatient care remained low, 
rates of hospital acquired infections continued to fall, public satisfaction was historically high, 
and most patients continued to report a positive experience of care’ (Parliament, 2015). 
However, areas such as hospital admissions saw a rising trend, and bed availability, particularly 
in mental health units, was ‘increasingly limited and the financial position of NHS providers is 
also worsening, indicating that some were struggling to cope with the reduced prices paid for 
services’ (Parliament, 2015). 
 
Decentralisation’s unexpected outcomes 
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Unless properly corrected by the current and succeeding UK governments, those having a 
mental illness and coming across with the police will have a better opportunity in richer and 
more resourceful areas that those in the poorest and most afflicted ones. In this sense, the 
austerity-driven restructuring of mental health services across England has already found 
resistance campaigns that feature alliances between service users, workers, trade unionists and 
anti-cuts activists (Moth, Greener and Stoll, 2015). Against this backdrop, we argue that at least 
three challenges need to be considered in this current wave of decentralisation reform: structural 
barriers to integrated polity, post-financial crisis policymaking, and the degree of differentiated 
corporate policies.   
 
Structural barriers to integrated polity 
Empowering local governance has put the police and the mental health NHS emergency 
services to reach networked multi-agency solutions to issues that were once dominated by silo-
making type of solutions (see Smith et al., 2011). However, it is argued that structural barriers 
to networks have not meant for professional thinking to allow inter-institutional and integrated 
policy-making when it comes to strategic, operational and frontline responses. Returning to the 
House of Common’s report, a paragraph within its final recommendations sheds light on these 
matters: 
 
The coalition government has recognised the poor state of current mental health services 
and it has made a commitment to put mental health at the same level as physical health. 
In addition to resources, there is a clear need for improved coordination between the 
organisations that come into contact with mental health sufferers. The Concordat has 
shown potential for bringing the relevant organisations together. Its success will be 
measured by how effective it is in those areas of the country where such relationships 
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are not well developed, where there is an absence of local leadership, and where the 
commitment to addressing the issues is absent (House of Commons, 2015, p. 36). 
 
The Mental Health Act of 1983 is the current guideline used to measure police responses to 
crises in mental health. Police officers in England enforce Section 136 of the code that allows 
them to take a person to a place of safety (usually where NHS professionals would take charge 
of matters) if there are concerns that requires immediate care or control in their own best 
interests or for the protection of others. If the number of detentions under Section 136 decrease, 
fewer people will most probably be held in a police cell where they are more sensitive to 
experience the trauma of being detained (Care Quality Commission, 2015; HM Government 
2014b). The House of Commons’ report proposed a change in the law so that police cells are 
no longer a ‘place of safety’ under the Mental Health Act (House of Commons, 2015, p. 9-15). 
On these matters, the conservative governments and the police have aligned. Theresa May 
delivered a speech in Westminster where she catalogued the issue of policing and mental health 
as ‘stubborn’, ‘hard to resolve’, ‘difficult to spot’ and ‘often neglected’. When it came 
specifically to the Section 136 issue, Theresa May argued the following:  
 
Imagine being transported to hospital not in an ambulance, but in the back of a police car. 
Or being detained in a police cell rather than a health-based place of safety or mental health 
ward. That encounter must be terrifying. The police are not medics. They are not mental 
health nurses. They are not social workers. But if the relationship between the police and 
the public is critical, then how the police and other agencies respond to vulnerable people 
is even more important still. It goes right to the heart of the British model of policing by 
consent (HM Government, 2014c). 
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The Home Office produced a 30-page ‘response’ to all of the 29 conclusions and 
recommendations made by the House of Commons (Home Office, 2015). Setting a tone of what 
government policy was all about, it argued, that government ‘has made clear that it is 
determined to remove the police from unnecessary or inappropriate involvement in what should 
primarily be a medical response’ (p. 3). Regarding detentions under Section 136, the document 
explicitly mentioned, 
 
In general, the overuse of police cells for people detained under section 136 reflects 
probable deficiencies in the service provision available from a number of local agencies. 
There are numerous reasons for police cells having been used too often, and these 
include local health-based places of safety lacking the necessary capacity, or refusing 
to accept the person for being intoxicated and/or bringing a real (or perceived) threat of 
violence. The overuse of cells may also have been influenced by some unnecessary use 
of section 136 by police officers, and lack of availability of Approved Mental Health 
Professionals (AMHPs) (p. 4). 
 
However, accountability to the current structure of British policing and mental health is quite 
limited. Section 136 detentions have shown to go down after street triage initiatives have been 
set up. However other underlying structural pillars have not. The budgetary demands of street 
triage and health liaising with the NHS suggested by the Bradley Report (2009) and the 
Independent Commission on Mental Health and Policing (2013) have proven to add little value 
for money (Heslin et al., 2016).  
 Police forces have fought back budgetary cuts beckoning that their services have 
improved. The number of Section 136 detentions have increased in England and Wales, from 
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23,859 detentions in 2016–17 to 25,143 in 2017–18. Although the reasons for its increase 
remain to many unclear (see Loughran, 2018; Thomas and Forrester-Jones, 2019), this data 
should be contextualised since a high number of mental health incidents do not end in a 
detention under Section 136. Also, a number of cases where police is spending resources are 
not being taken into consideration (for example, calls to the force control room that do not need 
police deployment or police attendance to events where people is later referred to other 
services). In this vein, a National Institute for Health Research report reviewing evidence on 
the outcomes for people in mental health crisis, concluded that there is little evidence to identify 
what works best to improve integrated urgent and emergency access to crisis care to guide 
police officers through the Mental Health Act responsibilities (Paton et al., 2016). Another 
report, published this time between the NHS’ Mental Health Network and the Association of 
Chief Police Officers diagnosed, in the same vein, that police, mental health services, local 
authority, A&E, and ambulance often only ‘sit and discuss’ issues raised by multi-agency 
working and how to resolve these (NHS Confederation, 2015). Nevertheless, inter-agency has 
not fully avoided that too many people in mental health crisis have been detained in police 
custody when they need urgent mental healthcare instead, nor has the police and mental health 
providers established a clear understanding of each other’s legal powers, roles and 
responsibilities (NHS Confederation, 2015, p. 1; Adebowale, 2013). 
 
Post-financial crisis policymaking 
Shortly after being re-elected in 2015, Cameron set out his plans for a seven-day NHS arguing 
his ‘commitment to free healthcare for everyone’, saying that his defectors had talked ‘a lot of 
rubbish’ about his policy programmes under austerity. ‘So first of all today I want to put the 
record straight loud and clear. They said we would cut the NHS. We haven’t and we won’t’, 
Cameron insisted (Prime Minister’s Office, 2015). Backing up his policy proposals resulted in 
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a wave of new funding for the local services although only disperse actions for delivery were 
outlined. A pool of £12 million was promised to expand services for mental health assessments 
to those arrested. According to government data, at least 50,000 people a year are assessed by 
liaison and diversion services following arrest, and almost 70% require mental health support 
(Department of Health, 2016). As well, another £15 million was granted between the 
Department of Health and the Home Office to provide health and community based places of 
safety across England to prevent vulnerable people being held in police cells. Government 
opened biddings in various priority areas where the use of police cells was amongst the highest, 
including Avon and Somerset, Cleveland, Derbyshire, Devon and Cornwall, Essex, 
Lincolnshire, Nottinghamshire, South Yorkshire, Sussex and West Yorkshire (Department of 
Health and Home Office, 2016). Open funding aimed to get co-sponsored applications between 
police, health and from other organisations, including health trusts, local authorities and the 
third sector. The move put the NHS and the police to work under shared budgets and 
collaborative processes of policy delivery. Truth is that so far there has been little evidence on 
the efficiency, for instance, of a non-traditional provider of places of safety. The Home Office, 
for instance, insisted in the specific case of a third sector-led scheme to trial an alternative place 
of safety in Sussex to offer a temporary safe and secure room to individuals brought to by the 
police or ambulance service (Richmond Fellowship, 2016). Such initiatives followed on the 
spirit of the Health and Social Care Act 2012 which provided with guidelines to resolve health 
matters through ring-fenced grants and funding with local accountability arrangements.  
 In summary, although mental health and policing decentralised planning under Cameron 
was grandiose, at the end of the day policy-making and its delivery occurred at the local level 
through existing institutional arrangements. The scale reduction from national to local 
governance (see Ansell and Torfing, 2015) has created central guidelines that need to travel to 
local scattered nodes for policy that with time have become self-reliable and financially 
 20
independent. Nonetheless, these have not grown equally nor at the same pace around England. 
Some have developed more complex economic policy models, while others stick to older 
models to respond to ad-hoc emergencies with limited monetary resources.  
 
Differentiated corporate policies  
Succeeding decentralisation policies have failed to see the endogenous capabilities for change 
that complex institutions confront as central government promotes local governance reform (see 
Lowndes and Lemprière, 2018). This has been evidenced mostly after the centre’s attempt to 
steer policymaking through what we interpret as agent and power-dependence approaches to 
central-local relations. In the health sector, for example, the local chapters of the NHS had 
historically seen a group of different interests from within it, such as the divisions between 
primary and secondary care, and general and specialist practitioners. On the other hand, in the 
policing sector, the reduction of the workforce came together with changes from within as 
duties allocated to police personnel sought to reorganise and break down barriers of traditional 
policing and risk-aversion assessments. Police forces around the country were centrally directed 
to ground-breaking partnerships with the health sector under novel rationales to vulnerability 
through a non-prosecutorial approach. Ian Blair, former commissioner of the Metropolitan 
Police, put it this way: 
 
The police and hospital A&E units have, in the past decade, become the only 24-hour 
public services for people in crisis. The police have had severe funding cuts but are still 
there at the end of a telephone. Anyone working in the NHS will admit that the 
government’s vaunted “parity of esteem” between physical and mental health has not 
been honoured, particularly for young people. Meanwhile local authority budgets, 
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which part-fund child and adolescent mental health service and community health 
teams, have not been protected at all (Blair, 2016). 
 
There are lessons to be learned, nevertheless, as the complex new field of policing and mental 
health remains a puzzle for government when understood as the sum of its parts. For instance, 
street triage services and clinical liaison and diversion, among others, will continue to be the 
word of the day in policing and mental health services. Despite the apparent centralisation of 
the UK, these initiatives have developed in very different ways in each of England’s regions 
and very much in accordance to what police forces and other regional agencies have to offer in 
terms of funding, structure, human and capital resources.  
Government’s further budget reductions stretching until 2020 were in part determined 
to end Tony Blair’s centralised performance management for the health sector. Cameron came 
to introduce a freer competition system with independent regulation in a second White Paper 
that set out the executive’s public health strategy (Department of Health, 2010). What this 
approach did not contemplate, however, was that policy planning and policy delivery where 
being formulated under two very different premises. Policy planning opted for a no extra 
budgets, whilst the delivery included a vast array of mechanisms that required funding. A 
Freedom of Information request by the BBC, showed that the budgets for mental health trusts 
fell by 2% from 2013–2014 to 2014–2015. According to the data, ‘53 out of 59 mental health 
trusts in England which responded to the FOI request, 29 said their budget would be lower this 
year than last’ (Bloch, 2016). Local authorities saw prevention budgets recede thus truncating 
the opportunities for mental health care to be delivered outside hospital units making a policy 
network governance approach across local health and non-health related institutions much less 
likely to succeed as a real alternative to traditional hospital services.  
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Although decentralisation and localism were meant to occur naturally and according to 
local realities, cross-sectoral issues such in local policing and mental health seem to cut through 
the isolation that local governance produces. Whilst for police it has become key to getting 
services across their regions in a cohesive and efficient form, often police forces only develop 
products for certain communities.  Consequently, even within the same region there can be 
differentiated services for their communities. The same happens in the health sector where the 
NHS is divided in different clinical providers and commissioning groups. On top of that, local 
services don’t have the same geographical remits most of the times overlapping dense areas 
where demand is greater, leaving less populated ones in hands of fewer services.  
 
Conclusion 
Decentralisation under austerity has brought local services together, however, we have argued 
that central-local relations have not necessarily benefited the on-going local inter-institutional 
governance in the areas of policing and mental health. Through promoting decentralised local 
governance, the executive hoped for the delivery and steering of resources to meet the needs of 
local vulnerable communities. However, issues beyond the control of the local policing and 
mental health agencies have stalled decentralised governance, in this case, what we proposed 
as structural barriers, receding budgets, and the evidence of differentiated powers across policy 
sectors to encourage engagement between local autonomous corporations, such as the police 
forces and the NHS.  
In light of the reduction of central government’s role in steering on-the-ground policies, 
for example, on the case of mental health and policing a set of horizontal arrangements have 
begun as a response to the ongoing budget cuts, however, there is stress in the structural system 
because of a lack of clear strategic direction happening under the de-centralisation paradigm; 
this time worsened when factoring in the effects of the policymaking under austerity and 
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cutbacks measures. For instance, the creation of the local PCCs in England and Wales attempted 
to solve local governance and accountability issues by giving them statutory powers 
enforcement and budgetary responsibilities that police forces could depend on to co-finance 
services (Lister and Rowe, 2015). However, we have argued that the current financial model 
for local governance seems to be outmoded. Previously, if local authorities had more political 
responsibility of the policymaking without central steering, they would arrange higher taxation 
schemes to cover for such delivery costs (Stewart, 2000; Stoker and Travers, 2001). Currently, 
and like the policing and mental health case study showed, central government frames the 
policy agenda, however, it does not necessarily distribute monetary resources. Local authorities 
on the other hand, have had their tax collection and budgets reduced, however, they have been 
empowered with more responsibilities in planning service delivery. Moreover, local 
policymakers are encouraged to engage in public-private partnerships through a networked type 
of central-local relations. However, for these to results in efficient public services delivery, they 
need to be steered by a demanding and also costing management capacity. This latter idea was 
argued by Andrews and Entwistle (2015), who indicated that public-private partnerships do not 
necessarily improve the quality of services, less so if they are left to their own devices.  
Local governance networks are having to fill the vacuum of authority left by 
decentralisation, developing new mechanisms for steering policy. For the case of the mental 
health and policing combined policy sector, it is difficult to forecast from where the power to 
enforce such relationships will come. Also, if institutions will abide in light of the myriad of 
heavy weight actors (such as the NHS, the PCCs, and the police forces) who are currently 
interlinked in different areas of public service, and not just in the mental health one. Without 
an overall agent authority, local actors make autonomous decisions which undermine attempts 
for networked partnerships. For instance, there are many problems over data sharing (even 
within organisations), for example, due to police having different systems for recording mental 
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health incidents and users involved to those used in the NHS.  In the overall security and welfare 
sectors, there are also significant overlaps of service provision spatially and a lack of clarity in 
terms of who has responsibility on moments of crises, something that decentralisation has made 
more evident lately. As seen in the police and mental health case, attempts to reconfigure local 
services ultimately shift patterns of demand without shifting structures, budgets, or joining 
differentiated corporate powers, which result in local agencies making huge efforts to remedy 
increasing management capacities. 
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